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         MindNet Journal - Vol. 1, No. 63
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         V E R I C O M M / MindNet         "Quid veritas est?"
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    The views and opinions expressed below are not necessarily the
    views and opinions of VERICOMM, MindNet, or the editors unless
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    Permission is given to reproduce and redistribute, for
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    Editor: Mike Coyle

    Assistant Editor: Rick Lawler

    Research: Darrell Bross

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    NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND OPERATIONS

    September 1995

    ----------------------------------------------------------------

    95-974 S

    September 14, 1995

    CRS Report for Congress
    --------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Research Service * The Library of Congress

    Nonlethal Weapons and Operations: Potential Applications and
    Practical Limitations

    John M. Collins Senior Specialist in National Defense Office of
    Senior Specialists

    SUMMARY

       Nonlethal weapons and operations (NLW), whether employed for
    offensive or defensive purposes, usually supplement rather than
    replace lethal instruments.(1)  They are designed to minimize
    fatalities among belligerents and non-combatants as well as
    unplanned damage to property during wars and so-called operations
    other than war. One important purpose, which accommodates
    policies of restraint with overwhelming power, is to expand
    options, complicate enemy decision making, and thereby promote
    greater freedom of action in the gap between relatively benign
    pressures (diplomacy, economic sanctions, military posturing),
    and deadly force. This brief report summarizes technological
    progress, potential operations, and practical constraints, then
    presents a series of questions that seem to merit better answers
    before senior DoD officials and Congress determine which NLW
    programs to support and which to defer or discard.(2)

    NONLETHAL WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES

       A few nonlethal weapons now are available for use by U.S.
    Armed Forces or could be in short notice, but a rich variety of
    innovated additions deliverable by manned aircraft, missiles,
    remotely piloted vehicles, motor transports, ships, and/or
    individuals is under development (see table).

    NONLETHAL WEAPONS
    Selected by Types and Characteristics

    Categories Typical Types      Primary      Land       Field
                                  Targets(1)  Mobile(2)   Testing
                                                          Feasible(3)
    --------------------------------------------------------------
    Biological Biodegrading         I, M      Variable      1-4 yr
               Microbes

    Chemical   Irritants (CS;
               Pepper Spray)          P         Yes        Complete

               Calmatives;
               Tranquilizers          P         Yes          1-4 yr
               Adhesives             M,P       Variable      1-4 yr
               ("Stickums")

               Antitraction
               ("Slickums")          M,P       Variable      1-4 yr

               Binding Agents
               (Fibers, Polymers)     I        Variable       1 yr

               Combustion Modifiers  I,M         Yes         1-3 yr

               Metal Embrittle-
               ments/Caustics         M          Yes         > 5 yr

               Odiferous Agents       P          Yes         1-4 yr

               Specialty Foam         P         Variable     < 1 yr

    Electro-
    magnetic   High-powered
               Microwave             I,M        Variable     1-4 yr

               Nonnuclear Electro-
               magnetic Pulse        M,I        Variable     1-4 yr

               Conductive Ribbons    M,I        Variable    Complete

    Directed
    Energy     Particle Beams        M,I        Variable     3-5 yr

    Thermal    Counter-Sniper
               Counter Mortar        P,I,M         Yes        1-4 yr

               Barriers               P           Yes        1-4 yr

    Acoustics  High Intensity
               Sound                  P           Yes        Complete

               Infrasound, Ultra-
               sound (VLF, VHF)       P           Yes         < 1 yr

    Electric
    Stun       Stun Guns; TASERS      P           Yes  Complete;<1yr

               Water Cannons          P           Yes       Complete

    Kinetic    Nonpenetrating
               Projectiles            P           Yes          < 1 yr

    Optical    Low Energy Lasers     M,P          Yes          < 1 yr

               Strobe Lights          P           Yes          < 1 yr

               Holographs             P           Yes          1-4 yr
               Directional & Omni-
               directional Flares    M,P          Yes           2 yr

    Infor-
    mational   Computer Software
               Corruption            M,I       Unnecessary       Now

               Voice Cloning          P        Unnecessary       2 yr

    ---

    1. I = Infrastructure; M = Material; P = Personnel
    2. Land Mobility varies with models. Weight volume, distance to
    target, and enemy defenses are key considerations.
    3. Feasible test dates may a bit optimistic. Availability
    commonly depends on complexities and funding.

    NOTE: This table was compiled from several sources. See Note 1,
    plus "Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment,"
    _International Defense Review_, July 1994, p. 33-39; Evancoe,
    Paul, "Tomorrow's Weapons of Choice?," _Military Technology_,
    June 1994, p. 68-71; "Draft Concept for Non-Lethal Capabilities
    in Army Operations," _Inside the Army_, July 31, 1995, p. 18-19;
    Kokoski, Richard, "Non- Lethal Weapons: A Case Study for New
    Technology Developments," _SIPRI Yearbook 1994_, NY, Oxford
    University Press, 1994, p. 373-378; Major Joseph W. Cook, III,
    et. al., _Non-Lethal Weapons and Social Operations_, a Study
    Conducted for HQ USAF/XOXI in association with the USAF Institute
    for National Security Studies at the Air Force Academy, June 27,
    1994, p. 6-13.

       Nonlethal antipersonnel weapons such as malodorous substances,
    nonpenetrating projectiles, stun guns, water cannons, and ear-
    splitting noises need no explanation. High-powered microwaves can
    melt electronic components; strobe lights may disorient
    individuals; holograms may confuse them; aqueous foams can fill
    enclosures and form barriers. Voice cloning makes it possible to
    simulate radio broadcasts by enemy officials as a specialized
    form of psychological operations. Embrittlements that break down
    molecular bonding in metals, super caustics that attack many
    otherwise immune materials, biodegrading bacteria that "eat"
    products such as petroleum, and low energy lasers that blind
    hostile sensors typify nonlethal weapons that primarily attack
    inanimate targets. Multipurpose implements like "slickums" and
    "stickums" could engage personnel and property. Each type, if and
    when perfected, will possess unique strengths and weaknesses
    compared with other lethal and nonlethal tools.

    POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

       U.S. Armed Forces have as yet put few sophisticated nonlethal
    weapons to practical tests. Marines, for example, deployed with a
    small assortment during the February withdrawal of U.N.
    peacekeepers from Somalia, but use was limited to a little sticky
    foam. Nearly all NLW, however, hypothetically may be applied
    under conditions short of armed combat and to deter, defend
    against, or defeat military aggression of any kind, sometimes
    independently, but most often as ancillaries to other arms
    (lethal means might often constitute essential "insurance
    policies").

    Operations Other Than War

       NLW would be politically attractive during humanitarian
    operations and are potentially valuable in other situations short
    of war, because they avoid military bloodletting that could
    strengthen enemy resolve and precipitate domestic/international
    censure. The U.S. Government might enhance economic sanctions by
    conducting nonlethal blockades or clandestinely employing
    computer viruses to cripple the offenders' financial system.
    Psychological operations specialists able to "capture" enemy
    radio and television frequencies would posses a powerful lever
    with which to influence public perceptions and attitudes during
    crises.

       Peacekeepers might profitably employ acoustic "barricades" to
    help keep hotheads apart during crises. Peace enforcers would
    welcome nonlethal weapons to disperse or otherwise control crowds
    and deny them access to sensitive areas such as embassies,
    arsenals, power plants, and telecommunications centers. Lasers
    that temporarily dazzle, but do not permanently blind, could
    discretely disable snipers who use noncombatants as human
    shields.  Nonlethal weapons also could simplify the evacuation of
    U.S. citizens and close associates from unfriendly soil.

       Counterterrorists might apply adhesives, antitraction
    substances, and combustion inhibitors to isolate hostage rescue
    sites, then tranquilize captors without jeopardizing captives.
    Special operations to neutralize enemy nuclear, biological and
    chemical warfare facilities could benefit from high-powered
    microwaves to suppress enemy defenses; super caustics and metal
    embrittlements could disable nuclear reactors, other processors,
    and finished weapons; compact particle beams in the hands of
    special operations forces could irradiate and neutralize nuclear,
    chemical, and biological munitions; aqueous foams could fill
    storage rooms thereafter.

    Wartime Operations

       Large-scale combat operations offer opportunities to employ
    nonlethal weapons independently or as complements of lethal
    power.  Strategically significant warfare against enemy
    officials, their supporters, and infrastructure theoretically is
    feasible on a grand scale. High tech sabotage might insert
    biodegrading bacteria into petroleum storage tanks and use
    high-powered microwaves to disable fuses in ammunition depots.
    Adhesives or superlubricants liberally applied on seaports, air
    base runways, highway intersections, steep railway grades, key
    bridges, and other bottlenecks could impede enemy military
    traffic or bring it to a standstill. Missiles and aircraft might
    deposit conductive ribbons (fine carbon fibers) on power grids to
    short-circuit switches and transformers, as they did during
    Operation Desert Storm.

       Nonlethal weapons also could be tactically advantageous.
    Counterinsurgents, whose main aim is to win hearts and minds,
    could minimize collateral damage and noncombatant casualties if
    armed with incapacitants. Foes in custody rather than body bags
    could furnish valuable intelligence as a bonus. Various nonlethal
    implements could favorably influence urban combat by blocking
    avenues of approach and escape, channel enemy formations into
    ambushes, flush out strong points while preserving sites of great
    cultural value, and simplified reconstruction problems after
    armed conflict ceases.

    PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS

       Practical factors constrain NLW applications. Weapon
    characteristics (size, weight, range, rates of fire,
    maintainability), legal limitations, ethics, rules of engagement,
    public opinion, arms control, and costs all impose limits.

    Technological Limitations

       Whether technologically complex nonlethal weapons will work as
    advertised awaits conclusive tests, some of which have not yet
    been devised. U.S. officials remain uncertain concerning the
    incidence of inadvertent fatalities (calmatives may render
    bystanders comatose; omnidirectional flares may blind friendly
    forces; infrasound can cause concussions if the setting is too
    strong).  Neither is it clear whether all allegedly reversible
    effects indeed are. No one is sure how often U.S. Armed Forces
    must reapply "slickums" to particular surfaces or what solvents
    would best remove adhesives that stick. Experiments to ascertain
    how fast embrittling agents will weaken metal are permissible,
    but test on people are limited to stringent controls. The likely
    influence of tranquilizers on factious crowds thus will remain
    speculative until using units accumulate practical experience.

       Some theoretically valuable nonlethal devices may prove
    difficult to deliver on targets. Strategic petroleum reserves
    stored in huge, widely separated tanks, some of which hold more
    than one million barrels apiece, are not readily accessible to
    infiltrators armed with flagons containing biodegrading microbes.
     Huge energy requirements frustrate attempts to develop
    man-portable EMP and microwave weapons. Metal embrittlements in
    many instances might have to be applied by brush-wielding humans
    in harm's way.  Battle damage assessments may demand creative
    techniques (how, for example, can stun gunners and pulse weapon
    operators verify whether human targets that bear no visible scars
    are incapacitate or playing possum?).

       Scenarios that envisage a mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons
    could overload ground troops unless separate NLW units are
    formed.  Logistical burdens and costs would increase in any case.
     Deployability prospects depend in large part on funds that might
    otherwise purchase, operate, and maintain traditional
    capabilities.

    Policy Limitations

       Policy limitations affect the choice of nonlethal weapons as
    much as (perhaps more than) technological constraints and costs.
    _Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2: Defense Management
    Policies and Procedures_ specifies that U.S. weapons and
    munitions must undergo legal reviews during development,
    procurement, and deployment to ensure compliance with laws of war
    and moral/ethical obligations. No other nations save the United
    Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany seem to have similar
    stipulations.

       The mention of biological and chemical warfare weapons raises
    red flags among arms control specialists and on Capitol Hill. Law
    enforcement units may use riot control agents against U.S.
    citizens, whereas _Executive Order 11850_ of April 10, 1075
    forbids first use, "in war except in defensive military modes to
    save lives such as:...situations in which civilians are used to
    mask or screen attacks...or to protect convoys from civil
    disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations..."  The
    benign use of biodegrading bacteria to clean up oil spills is
    permissible, but actions to contaminate enemy petroleum reserves
    might not be if narrow interpretations of the Biological Weapons
    Convention prevail. Dr. Matthew Meselson, Professor of
    Biochemistry at Harvard University, represents many who believe
    it would be unwise for nonlethal weapons to blur the line between
    use and non use of chemicals by U.S. Armed Forces, regardless of
    purposes. An independent task force sponsored by the Council of
    Foreign Relations, however, expressed a different opinion: "It
    would, of course, be a tragic irony if nations used lethal means
    against noncombatants because nonlethal means were banned by
    international convention.

       Computer viruses could infect enemy software in "peacetime"
    and in war. Plausible denial might prevent retaliation in kind
    but, if that ploy failed, the United States, being an information
    intensive society, could well be vulnerable to ruinous
    counterattacks. U.S. policymakers accordingly should proceed
    cautiously lest they inadvertently open Pandora's Box.

    SUGGESTED INQUIRIES

       Some nonlethal weapon proponents tend to harbor excessive
    expectations. Some opponents tend to reject NLW for emotional
    reasons. Positions that objectively compare nonlethal options
    with lethal alternatives probably occupy some as yet undefined
    middle ground. Solutions to unsolved problems consequently should
    precede decision to develop, acquire, and deploy particular
    systems. The following questions might prove useful:

    *  Which nonlethal weapons appear most attractive to
       commanders in chief of U.S. combatant commands?

    *  What would be the best mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons
       in DoD's arsenal?

    *  Should special units be formed within each Service to
       employ some or all nonlethal weapons? What role should U.S.
       Special Operations Command play?

    *  What rules of engagement should determine the choice between
       lethal and nonlethal weapons in emergencies?

    *  Would strong U.S. reliance on nonlethal weapons strengthen
       or weaken deterrence? How would U.S. allies view this trend?

    *  How would NLW alter strategic and tactical intelligence
       requirements?

    *  Would nonlethal weapons impose unreasonable logistic
       burdens?

    *  Which biodegrading and chemical non-lethal weapons are
       permissible given arms control conventions to which the
       United States is party?

    *  Should research, development, and acquisition activities as
       well as oversight be centralized under on authority? If so,
       who?

    *  Could the Department of Justice (DoJ) defray a larger share
       of DoD's nonlethal weapons costs? Would DoJ be willing?

    *  What size stockpiles of expendable munitions, such as
       adhesives, antitractions, and specialty foams, would be
       required at what costs?

    *  To what extent could costs be confined by modifying lethal
       weapon systems to handle nonlethal munitions as well?

    Hostile nations, non-state adversaries, and criminal
    organizations may acquire nonlethal weapons regardless of U.S.
    restraint. Prudent countermeasures consequently seem advisable
    whether DoD embraces selected systems or abstains.

    1. Various overviews include Morris, Janet and Chris,
    _Nonlethality: A Global Strategy_, Revised Ed., West Hyannisport,
    MA, 1994, 11 p; Swett, Charles F., _Strategic Assessment:
    Non-Lethal Weapons_, Washington, draft report, Office of
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and
    Low-Intensity Conflict), November 9, 1993, 20 p; Colonel John L.
    Barry, et al, _Nonlethal Military Means: New Leverage for a New
    Era_, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School
    of Government, 1994, 86 p;  _Non-Lethal Technologies: Military
    Options and Implications_, NY,  Council of Foreign Relations,
    1995, 16 p; Gray, Jan M., _Uses of  Nonlethal Force in Army
    Operations_, a White Paper (draft), Fort  Monroe, VA, U.S. Army
    Training and Doctrine Command, July 17, 1995,  43 p; _Policy
    Study: Non-Lethal Technologies_, Washington, JAYCOR, September
    19, 1994, 28 p; Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, "Less-Lethal Force
    in Operation United Shield," _Marine Corps Gazette_, September
    1995, p. 69-76.

    2. Some definitions of nonlethal weapons exclude
    parapsychological operations, deception, electronic warfare, and
    information warfare. This document concentrates on new
    technological developments.

    CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress.

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