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     MindNet Journal - Vol. 1, No. 68
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     V E R I C O M M / MindNet         "Quid veritas est?"
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The views and opinions expressed below are not necessarily the
views and opinions of VERICOMM, MindNet, or the editors unless
otherwise noted.

Permission is given to reproduce and redistribute, for
non-commercial purposes only, provided this information and the
copy remain intact and unedited.

Editor: Mike Coyle 

Assistant Editor: Rick Lawler

Research: Darrell Bross

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500

July 1994

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21 July 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Draft Non-Lethal Weapons Policy

Attached is a draft DoD policy for non-lethal weapons. We are
distributing this draft broadly for information and comment.
Comments should be forwarded by 19 August to Mr. Charles Swett,
703-693-5208 (voice), or 703-693-0615 (fax).

[original signed] 
Dr. Christopher Lamb 
Director, Policy Planning

---

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE 

January 1, 1995

Number xxxx.xx

DRAFT: 21 July 1994

SUBJECT: Policy for Non-lethal Weapons

A. Purpose

This Directive issues Department of Defense policies and
procedures governing the role of non-lethal weapons in U.S.
national security, their acquisition, and employment.

B. Definition

Non-lethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly
designed and employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel,
while minimizing fatalities and undesired damage to property and
the environment.

Unlike weapons that permanently destroy targets through blast,
fragmentation or penetration, non-lethal weapons have relatively
reversible effects on targets and/or are able to discriminate
between targets and non-targets in the weapon's area of impact.

C. Applicability

This directive applies to all non-lethal technology research and
development programs, non-lethal weapon procurement procedures
programs, OSD oversight of these programs, and modes of
employment of non-lethal weapons.

Precision lethal weapons are outside the scope of this Directive.
In addition, policy governing information warfare systems is
addressed in separate channels and is not covered by this
Directive.

D. Policy

1. General

In order to allow the maximum possible flexibility in the
employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of
conflict, it is essential that additional options short of the
use of lethal force be provided. Non-lethal weapons can make
available significant new capabilities in some circumstances to
achieve military objectives while minimizing human fatalities and
undesired damage to property and the environment. At the lower
end of the spectrum of conflict (Operations Other Than War),
non-lethal weapons can allow us to discourage, delay, or prevent
hostile actions by prospective opponents; limit escalation; take
military action in situations where intervention is desirable
but use of lethal force would be inappropriate; and better
protect our forces once deployed. Non-lethal weapons are
especially suited to operations such as peacekeeping,
humanitarian missions, and other operations short of war. At the
higher regions of the spectrum of conflict, including major
regional conflicts, non-lethal weapons can provide an effective,
reversible, or more humanitarian means of denying an enemy the
use of some of his human and material assets. They also may help
reduce the post-war economic cost of rebuilding infrastructure.

Non-lethal weapons reinforce deterrence and expand our range of
options. The presence of non-lethal weapons in America's arsenal
can strengthen deterrence by making potential adversaries aware
that the United States can thwart aggression and achieve
humanitarian aims in ways that do not entail prohibitive
political costs, thus enabling us to act earlier, more freely,
and more decisively.

A non-lethal weapons arsenal and the additional options it
provides does not negate the fact that many situations require
overwhelming lethal military force as the most appropriate means
to accomplish a mission. Particularly in situations involving
large-scale aggression by an adversary, overwhelming force may
ultimately be the best means of minimizing fatalities and
collateral damage by ensuring that the conflict comes to a rapid
and uncontested conclusion. In such cases, the roles of
non-lethal weapons are to contribute to the overall success of
the operation while helping to limit war damage.

It is understood that when employed, some non-lethal weapons may
inadvertently cause fatalities, since we will not have perfect
control over all factors. Complete avoidance of fatalities cannot
be guaranteed and should not be expected. However, non-lethal
weapons when properly employed dramatically reduce fatalities as
compared with physically destroying the same intended target.
Thus the intent is to be able to achieve military or politically
objectives while causing the minimum possible harm to personnel,
materiel, and the environment.

To the extent that non-lethal weapons reduce the likelihood of
loss of life and incidental damage to property in comparison with
conventional systems, they are not only politically and
operationally attractive options, but they are also consistent
with international law and further the professional military
responsibility to employ force proportionally and discriminately.

It is not envisioned that non-lethal weapons will supplant or
replace other classes of weapons, consume disproportionate
amounts of resources, or cause a major shift in the way wars are
fought. Rather, the intention is to allow the Department of
Defense to cost-effectively exploit non-lethal technologies in
order to provide the United States with significant strategic,
political, and operational advantages in conducting existing
missions.

2. Acquisition

A wide variety of non-lethal technologies have been suggested,
spanning a broad range of anti-personnel and anti-materiel
effects. In order to be most useful as instruments of national
policy, the highest priority should be placed on developing and
acquiring systems to support the following tasks (in descending
order of importance):

* Neutralize combatants intermingled with non-combatants

* Control crowds

* Disable or disrupt military logistics

* Disable or disrupt elements of, or the entirety of, a regional
  civil/military communications, transportation, and energy
  infrastructure.

* Disable or destroy weapons or weapon development/production
  processes, including suspected weapons of mass destruction

These tasks may arise at virtually any level of the full spectrum
of operations. This list will be reviewed and modified as
necessary by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

In addition to the priorities listed above, only those non-lethal
weapon programs that satisfy the general requirements for
technical feasibility, operational utility, and policy
acceptability will be considered for support. Specifically, in
order for any non-lethal weapon program to receive funding, it
must be explicitly found by the Non-Lethal Weapons Steering
Committee to satisfy the following criteria:

* Contribute to the accomplishment of a task or tasks that may be
  assigned to U.S. military forces

* Be consistent with established U.S. policies including arms
  control agreements or other international legal commitments 
  that the U.S. is committed to observe

* Be technologically and operationally feasible

* Be affordable

* Have an acceptably low probability of being fatal or inflicting
  permanent disablement on personnel, and causing undesired 
  damage to property and the environment

* Could not be easily defeated by enemy countermeasures once
  known; or if they could, the benefits of a single opportunity 
  to use them in a given context would be so great as to outweigh 
  that disadvantage

* Can achieve an effect that is worth the cost of the
  intelligence support they require

All other things being equal, non-lethal weapons that show
significant promise of dual-use by U.S. law enforcement agencies
as well as by the military Services will receive higher priority
than those that do not.

Oversight authority over all non-lethal weapon development and
acquisition programs will be exercised by a Non-Lethal Weapons
Steering Committee. This committee will be co-chaired by the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology (Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare Programs), and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Policy and Missions), and will consist of senior officials
from the following organizations:

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
  Technology
  
- Office of Munitions
- Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
- Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Technology

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
  Strategy 
  (Strategy and Requirements)
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
  Policy and Missions 
  (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
  Counterproliferation 
  (International Security Policy)

* Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense

* The Joint Staff

* The Military Services

* Defense Nuclear Agency

* Other Defense agencies (as determined by the co-chairs)

In addition, representatives of other U.S. Government departments
or agencies may be invited to participate in Steering Committee
discussions. These organizations may include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the Department of Justice, the Department
of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Environmental
Protection Agency.

The Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee will conduct an annual
review, phased appropriately with respect to the POM cycle, of
all non-lethal weapon programs, in order to provide oversight and
guidance. This committee will have the authority to initiate,
direct changes in, or terminate these programs, in order to
ensure that the priorities and criteria listed above are
enforced. In so doing, any validated military requirements
presented to the committee will be duly considered. The
Comptroller of the Department of Defense will issue Program
Budget Decisions implementing the decisions of the committee. The
committee will also have the authority to task the Services to
undertake such studies and analyses as are needed to support its
deliberations.

The Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee will adopt terms of
reference, issue an annual Non-Lethal Weapons Master Plan, and
issue security and classification guidance for non-lethal weapon
programs.

A Non-Lethal Weapons Working Group will assist the Non-Lethal
Weapons Steering Committee. This group will consist of officials
from the organizations represented on the Steering Committee, and
will undertake activities as directed by that committee. The
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology will assure that funding is available to support these
bodies, and that all members of both bodies are cleared in a
timely manner into any and all non-lethal weapon development and
acquisition programs.

The Joint Program Office will support the Non-Lethal Weapons
Steering Committee, by providing studies, analyses, and
recommendations as directed by that committee. Its charter will
be modified as necessary to provide for this role. The Non-Lethal
Weapons Steering Committee will ensure that the costs of
necessary support provided by the Joint Program Office and other
sources are met.

The Military Services will develop and acquire weapons specific
to their particular mission area or expertise, and will develop
and implement doctrine, employment concepts, tactics, training,
and logistic support for fielded non-lethal weapon systems.

3. Employment

In developing policy for specific cases of current or planned
military operations, officials from the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy will ensure that options for
use of applicable non-lethal weapons are given due consideration.
This will include making the President aware of such options, as
appropriate.

Any direction given regarding the conduct of U.S. military
operations to employ non-lethal weapons will not restrict
self-defense measures by our forces to non-lethal means. Although
our forces might be allowed to employ only non-lethal weapons to
achieve mission objectives in some cases, they will in all cases
be allowed to use necessary lethal force to protect themselves
from deadly threats.

In order to improve the military effectiveness and deterrent
value of non-lethal weapon employment, full consideration will be
given to appropriate psychological operations before, during or
after that employment.

Non-lethal weapons can be employed either alone or in conjunction
with lethal weapons.

When a plan to employ non-lethal weapons in a specific case is
submitted for approval, it must be explicitly stated to all
concerned that some fatalities might inadvertently result.

Non-lethal weapons may be employed to achieve a variety of
objectives, including, but not necessarily limited to, the
following:

* Neutralization - to make an adversary's assets useless

* Denial - to deny an adversary the attainment of his ends

* Control - to eliminate an adversary's ability to control his
  assets, and/or to seize control of them ourselves

* Limit escalation - prevent an increase in the scale or
  intensity of a conflict

* Enticement - to help persuade an adversary to act in a way 
  that is congruent with U.S. interests

* Demonstration - to display U.S. resolve or concern, but 
  without crossing the threshold of lethal force or significant 
  destruction

* Countermobilization - to retard or frustrate mobilization of an
  adversary's military forces in order to provide more time for
  diplomatic actions or for deployment of U.S. or allied military
  reinforcements to the area in question

* Interdiction in ambiguous situations - were we suspect that
  activity inimical to U.S. interests is underway and would like 
  to take steps to frustrate it but where we may not have 
  convincing intelligence confirming our suspicions

* Highly specific attack - where the target is proximate to a
  significant non-military asset that must not be damaged under
  any circumstances, such as a religious, cultural, or 
  historical symbol

* Synergism - to accelerate and intensify the effects of lethal
  measures, used in conjunction with non-lethal systems weapons

The term "adversary" is used above in it broadest sense,
including those who are not declared enemies but who are engaged
in activities we wish to stop. This policy does not preclude
legally authorized domestic use of non-lethal weapons by U.S.
military forces in support of law enforcement.

Commanders of combat organizations will incorporate options for
use for fielded non-lethal weapon systems into their contingency
plans as appropriate.

4. Additional Policy Guidance

Requests for policy guidance on non-lethal weapons matters not
addressed in this Directive should be forwarded to the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict (Deputy Assistant for Policy and
Missions).

E. Public Affairs Guidance

Information provided to the public and the media should be in
keeping with the policies put forth in Section D.1 of this
Directive. Authorization for release of specifics about the types
of non-lethal weapons in our arsenal or under development, or the
circumstances in which they would be used, will be considered on
a case-by-case basis by OUSD(P) or by the Non-Lethal Weapons
Steering Committee, as appropriate.

Public affairs statements should emphasize that although the use
of non-lethal weapons us intended to avoid fatalities and
collateral damage in the course of achieving mission objectives,
some fatalities or collateral damage could inadvertently result.
It is important that the public understand that just as lethal
weapons do not achieve perfect lethality, neither will
"non-lethal" weapons always be capable of precluding fatalities
and undesired collateral damage.

F. Effective Date

This Directive will become effective upon signature.

William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense

Comments on this draft should be forwarded to Mr. Charles Swett,
OASD(SO/LIC) 703-693-5208 (voice) 703-693-0615 (fax)

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